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Non-technical summary:
Beyond the fundamental incentive problems of international cooperation, climate change
policy has an important political economy dimension. In the standard political economy
approach, any government is motivated by the objective of maximizing its political income,
i.e. the probability of being re-elected. In order to be re-elected, the government must obey the
preferences of the pivotal voter, who can be approximated by the median voter in a
democracy. Thus, the national median voter imposes a restriction on what would be
acceptable to a government in international environmental negotiations. Ultimately, one
would expect a government only to enter into agreements that are acceptable to the median
voter. From a political economy point of view, thus, the median voter’s willingness to pay
ultimately determines the outcome of international environmental negotiations.
In this paper, we investigate the political economy conjecture for the case of the Kyoto
Protocol. We have shown that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward
given the potential compliance costs and the domestic voters’ low willingness to pay. U.S.
withdrawal in 2001 had a major impact on the subsequent climate policy negotiations at Bonn
and Marrakech, since it endowed remaining key parties with veto bargaining power. Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Russia, could, thus, achieve far-reaching concessions from
the European Union on carbon sinks and tradability of emission rights, in particular hot air
trade from the Former Soviet Union. Taking these concessions into account, Kyoto was
essentially reduced to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions
and makes compliance to a rather cheap deal.
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Abstract
We show that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward under political
economy considerations. The reason is that U.S. compliance costs exceed low willingness to
pay for dealing with global warming in the U.S. The withdrawal had a crucial impact on the
concretion of the Protocol prior to its likely ratification at the end of 2002. Remaining non-EU
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol gained veto bargaining power and, thus, were successful in
asserting far reaching concessions from the EU on sink credits and tradability of emission
rights. Taking these concessions into account, the Kyoto Protocol was essentially reduced to a
symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance
a rather cheap deal.
JEL classification: D58, H40, Q43
Keywords: climate policy, political economy, willingness to pay
21. Background
During the last decade, the issue of international cooperation in climate protection has
received increasing attention in economic research. The main focus has been on the
underlying economic incentives for sovereign states to enter into international environmental
agreements. Since climate protection constitutes the problem of providing a global public
good, it is faced with severe incentive problems for governments that try to maximize their
net economic benefits. The game-theoretical literature has provided important insights into
the difficulties of establishing effective and efficient cooperation on the provision of climate
protection (see Finus (2001) for an overview).
Beyond the fundamental incentive problems of international cooperation, climate change
policy has an important political economy dimension. In the standard political economy
approach, any government is motivated by the objective of maximizing its political income,
i.e. the probability of being re-elected. In order to be re-elected, the government must obey the
preferences of the pivotal voter, who can be approximated by the median voter in a
democracy. Thus, the national median voter imposes a restriction on what would be
acceptable to a government in international environmental negotiations. Ultimately, one
would expect a government only to enter into agreements that are acceptable to the median
voter. From a political economy point of view, thus, the median voter’s willingness to pay
ultimately determines the outcome of international environmental negotiations. Surprisingly,
this fact has been widely ignored in the literature (one notable exception is Congleton (1992)).
We investigate the political economy conjecture for the case of the Kyoto Protocol. This
Protocol was negotiated in 1997 during the Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the
United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. It requires industrialized
countries (as listed in its Annex B) to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), most
notably CO2 from fossil fuel combustion. Initially, the Kyoto Protocol was supposed to
provide a large cutback in business-as-usual emissions for the developed world and, therefore,
was celebrated as a breakthrough in international climate protection (Oberthür and Ott
(1999)).
Based on calculations with an established computable general equilibrium model of global
trade and energy use, we show that the Kyoto treaty – in its original from – would have not
3only effected a substantial cutback in the developed world’s business-as-usual emissions but
also imposed non-negligible costs for major signatory countries. In our analysis, we use the
associated per-capita costs of implementing Kyoto as a measure for the required willingness
to pay for having such a climate policy enacted.
The Kyoto conference in 1997 left open several crucial aspects of concrete implementation,
especially with respect to carbon sinks, i.e. forests and agricultural soils that store CO2, and
the question of full versus restricted tradability of emission rights across Annex B countries.
Re-negotiations during COP6 at Bonn (June 2001) and COP7 at Marrakech (November 2001)
led to a generous accounting of carbon sinks and unrestricted trade in emissions rights.
Particularly free permit trade accommodates larger cuts in overall compliance costs because
Russia and Ukraine can sell huge amounts of surplus emission rights (so called “hot air”)
which was ceded to them in the original Kyoto deal. We show that even under these relaxed
constraints, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would still have been quite costly for the
U.S. Since public opinion polls in the U.S. indicate a rather low willingness to pay for climate
policy and re-negotiation leeway had been exhausted, the withdrawal of the U.S. government
from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001 does not come as a surprise from a political economy
point of view.
Ironically, U.S. withdrawal can be regarded as ultimate impetus for the ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. The reason is the so-called “double trigger” for entering into force of the
Protocol. On the one side, at least 55 countries have to ratify the treaty by their national
parliaments. On the other side, those countries which ratify the treaty have to account for at
least 55 % of the CO2 emissions in 1990 (the Protocol’s baseyear). Since the U.S. is by far the
biggest emitter of CO2 among Annex B parties, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol after U.S.
withdrawal requires approval of the remaining major parties. More specifically, it was no
longer possible for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force the without participation of Russia
or the country group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. After U.S. withdrawal,
these countries used their veto bargaining power in the subsequent climate negotiations at
Bonn (June 2001) and Marrakech (November 2001) to obtain far-reaching concessions from
the European Union (EU) on the controversial issues of sink credits and emissions trading.
Our simulation results show that these concessions reduce Kyoto to a symbolic treaty.
Ratification of the treaty for the remaining Annex B countries now comes at virtually no
economic costs while environmental effectiveness is driven close to zero.
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents cost estimates of
implementing Kyoto in its original form. Section 3 explains the recent U.S. withdrawal from a
political economy perspective. Section 4 explores the implications of U.S. withdrawal on the
subsequent climate policy negotiations. Section 5 concludes.
2. Emission Reduction Constraints and Required Willingness to Pay
In the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries have adopted quantified emission limitation
and reduction objectives with reference to their 1990 emission levels. The column labeled
“Baseline Emissions - 1990” of Table 1 lists the historic emissions for all Annex B regions,
while the column labeled “Nominal Reduction” provides the reduction targets as originally
foreseen by the Protocol. For reasons of data availability, we apply the GHG reduction targets
to CO2 only, which is by far the most important GHG among industrialized countries.
Table 1: Baseline emissions, percentage reduction, absolute cutbacks
Region Baseline Emissions
(MtC)a
Nominal Reduction
(% wrt 1990)
Effective Reduction
(% wrt 2010)
Absolute
Cutback
(MtC wrt 2010)
1990   2010
AUN 88 130
CAN 127 165
EUR 929 1041
JPN 269 331
EEC 301 227
FSU 1036 713
-6.8
6.0
7.8
6.0
7.1
0.0
27.7
27.7
17.7
23.6
-23.2
-45.3
36
46
184
78
-53
-323
Total U.S. outb 2750 2607 5.0 -0.7 -32
USA 1347 1809 7.0 30.8 556
Total U.S. inc 4097 4416 5.0 11.9 525
Key: AUN – Australia and New Zealand, CAN – Canada, EUR - OECD Europe (incl. EFTA),
JPN – Japan, EEC - Central and Eastern Europe, FSU - Former Soviet Union (incl. Ukraine).
a  Source: International Energy Outline (IEO 2001) - reference case
b
 Annex B without U.S. compliance
c
 Annex B with U.S. compliance
The reduction targets with respect to 1990 are only nominal in the sense that they apply to
historic emission levels. Since these targets will not become legally binding before the Kyoto
commitment period (2008-2012), the appropriate reference for the effective cutback
requirements are the business-as-usual (BaU) emissions during the commitment period. The
column labeled “Baseline Emissions - 2010” reports the projected BaU emissions for the
5central year 2010 based on the reference scenario of the most recent International Energy
Outlook (IEO 2001) by the U.S. Department of Energy. Except for the economies in
transition, which include Eastern and Central Europe (EEC) as well as the Former Soviet
Union (FSU), the nominal commitments translate into much more stringent reduction
requirements, since industrialized countries are projected to have economic growth
accompanied by a considerable increase in GHG emissions from fossil fuel combustion. For
example, Australia and New Zealand (AUN) receive emission rights that are roughly 7 %
higher than their 1990 reference emission levels, but in 2010 they will nevertheless face an
effective cutback requirement of nearly 28 % vis-à-vis their BaU emissions. Apparently, the
economies in transition have been endowed with emission entitlements under the Kyoto
Protocol that are well in excess of their anticipated future BaU emissions. As will be
elaborated below, the availability of these excess emissions, referred to as “hot air”, will
crucially affect the potential compliance costs of OECD countries under the Kyoto Protocol.
The column labeled “Absolute Cutback” converts the effective percentage reduction into
absolute cutback requirements. An assessment of Table 1 with respect to the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol in its original form (i.e. U.S. compliance and OLD targets) indicates
that the Kyoto Protocol demands a substantial cutback of BaU emissions in the industrialized
world. Even in the case of unrestricted Annex B trade in emission rights, which would allow
for the full availability of hot air from EEC and FSU, aggregate Annex B emissions are
supposed to fall by roughly 12 % as compared to BaU in 2010.
Given some indication of the voter's actual willingness to pay for climate protection, the
key issue regarding political acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol are the compliance costs
associated with the implementation of the Kyoto targets. These compliance costs can be
readily interpreted as the required willingness to pay to have the Kyoto targets enacted. To
measure compliance costs, we employ an established computable general equilibrium model
of world trade and energy use that simulates the economic adjustment costs to emission
constraints. The general equilibrium approach provides a consistent and comprehensive
framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy system and the rest
of the economy. It has become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts
of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications
for incomes of economic agents (see Weyant (1999) for a recent survey on model-based
studies).
6The concrete multi-sector, multi-region model underlying our analysis has been extensively
used in the past to quantify the economic impacts of alternative GHG abatement strategies
(see e.g. Böhringer (2000), Rutherford and Paltsev (2000), Böhringer (2002), Böhringer and
Rutherford (2002), Böhringer and Löschel (2002)). For the sake of brevity, we abstain here
from presenting a comprehensive appendix on the model algebra and the model
parameterization, which can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/kp-
polecon.pdf. We use this model to quantify the economic and environmental consequences of
abatement policies with respect to the BaU situation in 2010, which is based on most recent
projections of the U.S. Department of Energy (IEO (2001)). Due to a dominant supply
position stemming from huge amounts of hot air (see Table 1), FSU is treated as monopolist
on imperfectly competitive international permit markets (Westkog (1996)). As a monopolist,
FSU restricts permit supply by charging a mark-up over its marginal abatement cost (which
are zero for hot air) to maximize profits.
Table 2 summarizes the effects for two alternative designs of implementing Kyoto on
consumption and global emissions. Scenario NTRin_OLD considers the implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol based on the original reduction targets, U.S. compliance and fully domestic
action (i.e. no trade in emission rights). Scenario TRDin_NEW reflects the case in which the
original Kyoto targets are adjusted for sink credits, U.S. complies, and emissions are fully
tradable across Annex B regions. Under NTRin_OLD adjustment costs – measured in
percentage loss of BaU consumption – range from 0.2 % for EUR to 1.5 % for CAN
indicating differences in the effective cutback requirements, the ease of carbon substitution in
production and consumption, and indirect losses or benefits through changes in international
prices (terms-of-trade effects). The latter are the reason why EEC and FSU as well as ROW
are affected by abatement policies of trading partners even though they do not face a binding
emission constraint. Terms-of-trade effects work primarily through the decline of
international fuel prices following the drop in energy demand under emission reduction
policies: As a net fuel importer, EEC benefits from cheaper energy imports, while FSU and
ROW, which are net fuel exporters, are negatively affected (see Böhringer and Rutherford
(2002) for a detailed discussion). When we convert the percentage changes in consumption
into equivalent payments per capita, the specific costs for abating OECD regions range from
23 USD/capita for EUR to 162 USD/capita for CAN. The compliance costs for the U.S.
amounts to 92 USD.
7Table 2: Key economic and environmental impacts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol
Region NTRin_OLD TRDin_NEW
Consumption Change in % vs. BaU
AUN Australia and New Zealand -1.18 -0.63
CAN Canada -1.48 -0.50
EUR Europe -0.17 -0.10
JPN Japan -0.26 -0.06
EEC Central and Eastern Europe 0.49 2.16
FSU Former Soviet Union -0.93 2.78
USA USA -0.51 -0.27
ROW Rest of the World -0.35 -0.13
TOTAL -0.24 -0.06
Consumption change in USD97 per capita
AUN Australia and New Zealand -114 -62
CAN Canada -162 -53
EUR Europe -23 -13
JPN Japan -53 -13
EEC Central and Eastern Europe 8 36
FSU Former Soviet Union -12 34
USA USA -92 -49
Emission reduction in % vs. BaU
TOTAL 9.6 4.4
 Scenario TRDin_NEW provides revised cost estimates that account for the recent outcome
of Bonn in June 2001 and Marrakech in November 2001: Besides the generous accounting of
carbon sink credits, parties have implicitly agreed on unrestricted Annex B emissions trading.
These concretions to the Kyoto Protocol substantially lower compliance costs but would still
impose a significant consumption loss for AUN, CAN and the U.S. with an annual per-capita
cost of 62 USD (AUN), 53 USD (CAN) and 49 USD.
The figures presented in Table 2 are based on central case elasticities (see Table A.7 of
appendix). To evaluate the sensitivity of our model estimates to uncertainties in the
parameterization space, we have performed an extensive sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity
analysis confirms robustness of results with respect to key elasticities and alternative baseline
assumptions. In the remainder of our analysis, we, therefore, interpret the per-capita cost
figures of Table 2 as required WTP of countries that are engaged in the climate change
negotiations.
83. The Rationale behind U.S. Withdrawal
We have argued that in a political economy context, governments will keep the preferences
of their voters in mind. They will not agree upon treaties that would not find the support of
the median voter at home. To investigate the prospects of GHG abatement policies, we must
compare the required willingness to pay (WTP) with the actual (revealed) WTP for climate
protection by the domestic median voter. The required WTP for the U.S. as quantified in
Table 2 appears substantial even for Kyoto in its re-negotiated form. This raises the question
of whether actual WTP for mitigating climate change in the U.S. ever reached such high
levels.
Unfortunately, quantitative estimates of the demand for mitigating climate change are
sparse in the literature. There are two established methods that could be used for measuring
environmental preferences with respect to climate change. First, one could try to estimate the
demand for climate protection from some theoretical model, e.g. a public good model. This
approach is taken by Murdoch and Sandler (1997) for the case of ozone layer depletion.
However, their study stands as a rare, if not unique attempt to measure environmental demand
in the context of a global public good. Second, one could try to detect people’s preferences by
asking them directly, e.g. by using the framework of a contingent valuation study. This type
of study has also been used extremely seldom to address the question of environmental
demand in an international context. We only know of one contingent valuation study in this
context, that has been performed for Switzerland (see Ledergerber et al. (1995)).
It seems, hence, appropriate to rely on public opinion polls as reported in Tables 3 and 4 for
the U.S. Some difficulties in interpretation arise with respect to the obscure category “neither
willing nor unwilling”. To our understanding, these respondents indicated that they do not
want a change of the status quo. We therefore add them to those respondents that are opposed
to higher taxes or cuts in their standard of living. The tables then clearly show that a vast
majority of U.S. citizens is not willing to pay much higher taxes or to accept cuts in their
standard of living in order to protect the environment.
Moreover, this fraction of respondents rose from about 60 % in 1993 to about 70 % in
2000. Even if we skip the category “neither willing nor unwilling”, the recent polls for 2000
report a distinct majority of people that are opposed to higher eco-taxes or income losses for
the sake of the environment.
9Table 3: Acceptance of high eco-taxes
U.S. 1993 (%) U.S. 2000 (%)*
(1) Very willing 7.3 6.17
(2) Fairly willing 32.9 25.45
(3) Neither nor 20.4 26.99
(4) Fairly unwilling 25.8 19.28
(5) Very unwilling 13.6 22.11
Sum (4) and (5) 39.4 41.39
Sum (3), (4) and (5) 59.8 68.38
*own calculations based on unreleased raw data from ISSP (2000)
Question: How willing would you be to pay much higher taxes in order to protect the environment?
Source: ISSP (1993) and ISSP (2000)
Table 4: Acceptance of cuts in standard of living
U.S. 1993 (%) U.S. 2000 (%)*
(1) Very willing 6.2 5.47
(2) Fairly willing 27.9 23.93
(3) Neither nor 24 26.67
(4) Fairly unwilling 26.2 20.51
(5) Very unwilling 15.6 23.42
Sum (4) and (5) 41.8 43.93
Sum (3), (4) and (5) 65.8 70.6
*own calculations based on unreleased raw data from ISSP (2000)
Question: How willing would you be to accept cuts in your standard of living in order to protect the environment?
Source: ISSP (1993) and ISSP (2000)
It must be conceded that the polls asked for the protection of the environment in general
and so are not specific to the problem of climate change. However, as we can see from Table
5, the topic “Environment “ is strongly dominated by other issues like “Ethics”, “Crime”, or
“Drugs”. Moreover, “global warming” is a very low ranking issue even on the environmental
agenda (see Table 6 - entries show the percentage of respondents who “worried a great deal”).
Hence, we can safely conclude that if willingness to pay for the protection of the environment
as a whole is already low, it will be even lower for climate change protection in particular.
The Bush administration obviously perceived that compliance to Kyoto even in its “lite”
version would have imposed substantial costs on the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the U.S.
recognized that additional negotiation to make the Protocol acceptable to the U.S. public was
not possible. The two key issues of re-negotiation, sinks and tradability, had been already
very stressed in the climate negotiations prior to U.S. withdrawal. There was no more leeway
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left to further lower the U.S. target. Realizing the discrepancy between required and actual
WTP for mitigating climate change, the U.S. withdrew.
Table 5: Ranking of different political topics in the U.S.
Problem April 2000 January 2001
Ethics/ moral/ family decline/
 Dishonesty/ lack of integrity
7 13
Education 11 12
Crime/ violence 12 9
Drugs 5 7
Health care 6 7
The economy (general) 4 7
Taxes 3 5
Poverty/ hunger/ homelessness 6 4
Environment/ pollution 2 2
Lack of military defense 1 2
Question: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?
Source: Gallup (2001, p.4)
Table 6: Ranking of different environmental topics in the U.S.
May 1989 April 1990 April 1991 Oct 1997 April 1999 April 2000
Pollution of lakes, rivers and
_reservoirs
72 64 67 61 66
Contamination of soil and water
_by toxic waste
69 63 62 63 64
Air pollution 63 58 59 42 52 59
Loss of natural habitat for
_wildlife
58 51 53 49 51
Ocean and beach pollution 60 52 53 50 54
Damage to the ozone layer 51 43 49 33 44 49
Loss of tropical rain forests 42 40 42 49 51
Acid rain 41 34 34 29 34
Global warming 35 30 35 24 34 40
Question: I’m going to read you a list of environmental problems. As I read each one, please tell me if you personally worry about this
problem a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or not at all?
The table shows the percentage of respondents who worried a great deal.
Source: Gallup (2000, p.4)
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U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol seems to have voter’s support not only under
narrow WTP considerations but also under specific fairness perceptions. In fact, there has
been skepticism about Kyoto in the U.S. for several years. Prior to the Kyoto conference, the
U.S. Senate unanimously passed the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which makes ‘meaningful
participation’ of developing countries a conditio sine qua non for ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol. The Senate made clear that it will not accept any treaty on climate change ‘unless
the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same
compliance period’ (Oberthür and Ott (1999), p.70). The vast majority of the American public
was supportive of the Senate’s reservation on ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, as is
indicated by Table 7.
Table 7:  U.S. opinion on burden sharing
All countries the same changes 70 %
Developing countries less burden 19 %
Don’t know 8 %
Both/ neither 3 %
Question: Some people say that since poorer countries did not cause much pollution, they should not have to bear as much
of the burden in dealing with global warming. Others say that every country, rich or poor, should make the same
changes in order to limit future global warming. Which of these views comes closer to your own?
Source: Princeton Survey Research/ Pew 1997, cited in:
http://www.publicagenda.org/issues/angles_graph.cfm?issue_type=environment&id=93&
graph=mp9.gif
A U.S. survey conducted by Wirthlin in September 1998 (Wirthlin 1998) yields very
similar results. When confronted with the statement: ‘I do not support the Kyoto Protocol
because it unfairly forces developed countries to reduce pollutants, while allowing other
countries to continue polluting’, 25 % of the respondents agreed strongly and 43 % told the
interviewers they agreed somewhat. Only 30 % agreed to the following statement: ‘It is only
fair that undeveloped countries should not be held to the same pollution standards, since they
still need to catch up with the rest of the developed countries’ (Wirthlin (1998), p.6).
4. The Implications of U.S. Withdrawal
U.S. withdrawal had a major impact on the subsequent climate negotiations, since it gave
veto bargaining power to important single countries in the climate talks. Due to the “double
trigger” mechanism, entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol is no longer possible without
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participation of Russia and the country group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
All of these regions have expressed reluctance to agree to the Protocol without major
revisions to its original amendments.
After years of tedious negotiations, U.S. withdrawal paved the way for the Bonn agreement
of remaining Annex B countries on the final implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The
agreement at Bonn in June 2001 (which has been confirmed at the Marrakech climate
conference in November 2001) was the straightforward result of the altered bargaining
situation. After U.S. withdrawal, remaining non-EU countries could strive for far-reaching
concessions of the EU. The EU had always been very restrictive on the key issues of “sinks”
and “tradability”. With respect to the former issue, the EU demanded for a long time to
exclude sinks as a means for the fulfillment of reduction targets in the first commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol 2008-2012. With respect to the latter issue, it always favored
strict caps on tradability to suppress trade in hot air.
Table 8 presents quantitative evidence on the economic and environmental impacts of
emissions trading (NTR versus TRD), U.S. withdrawal (in versus out), and the adjustment of
the Kyoto targets for sink credits (OLD versus NEW). These changes to the original Kyoto
Protocol have drastically reduced compliance costs. The downside is that the environmental
effectiveness of the Protocol is driven close to zero as hot air from FSU can be fully traded
(see also Böhringer (2002)).
In our political economy context, one can assert that U.S. withdrawal has significantly
promoted the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol because it essentially reduces compliance for
remaining Annex B countries to mere symbolic policy.
Table 8 also provides interesting insights on the self-declared “climate leadership” of the
EU. In cross-country comparison of implementation costs, EU ranks lowest. WTP for the
implementation of Kyoto in its original form would have required a WTP which is five times
higher in AUN and seven times higher in CAN than in EUR. It is unlikely that WTP in these
countries would have ever reached such high levels. For the EU, however, it has been very
easy to act as a protagonist of ambitious reduction targets, since the implied costs for the EU
would have been relatively low.
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Table 8: Economic and environmental impacts of implementing the Kyoto Protocol
NTRin_OLD NTRout_OLD NTRout_NEW TRDout_NEW
Consumption change in % vs. BaU
AUN -1.18 -1.09 -0.93 -0.29
CAN -1.48 -0.62 -0.29 -0.13
EUR -0.17 -0.24 -0.19 -0.06
JPN -0.26 -0.34 -0.22 -0.05
EEC 0.49 0.27 0.22 0.75
FSU -0.93 -0.69 -0.59 0.38
USA -0.51 0.01 0.01 0.00
ROW -0.35 -0.19 -0.15 -0.03
TOTAL -0.24 -0.12 -0.09 -0.01
Consumption change in USD97 per capita
AUN -114 -107 -90 -28
CAN -162 -68 -32 -15
EUR -23 -31 -24 -8
JPN -53 -67 -43 -9
EEC 8 4 3 12
FSU -12 -9 -7 5
USA -92 - - -
Emission reduction in % vs. BaU
TOTAL 9.6 2.8 2.3 0.7
5. Conclusion
We tried to shed some light on recent developments in the climate change negotiations
from a political economy point of view. We have shown that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto
Protocol is straightforward given the potential compliance costs and the domestic voters’ low
willingness to pay.
U.S. withdrawal in 2001 had a major impact on the subsequent climate policy negotiations
at Bonn and Marrakech since it endowed remaining key parties with veto bargaining power.
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Russia thus could achieve far-reaching
concessions from the EU on carbon sinks and tradability of emission rights, particularly hot
air trade from the Former Soviet Union. Taking these concessions into account, Kyoto
reduces to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes
compliance a rather cheap deal.
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